Arbeitspapier

Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

In this paper we are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by regrouping goods in her initial endowment. We present a suitable environment in which the existence of such rules can be analysed, and show the incompatibility of efficiency, individual rationality and regrouping-proofness even if agents' preferences are additive separable.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Papers ; No. 367

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
Thema
Exchange markets
Indivisible goods
Regrouping-proofness

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dimitrov, Dinko
Haake, Claus-Jochen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
(wo)
Bielefeld
(wann)
2005

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7321
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dimitrov, Dinko
  • Haake, Claus-Jochen
  • Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Entstanden

  • 2005

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