Arbeitspapier
Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
In this paper we are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by regrouping goods in her initial endowment. We present a suitable environment in which the existence of such rules can be analysed, and show the incompatibility of efficiency, individual rationality and regrouping-proofness even if agents' preferences are additive separable.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Papers ; No. 367
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Public Goods
- Thema
-
Exchange markets
Indivisible goods
Regrouping-proofness
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Dimitrov, Dinko
Haake, Claus-Jochen
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
- (wo)
-
Bielefeld
- (wann)
-
2005
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7321
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Dimitrov, Dinko
- Haake, Claus-Jochen
- Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Entstanden
- 2005