Arbeitspapier
A generalized condorcet jury theorem with two independent probabilities of error
The Condorcet Jury Theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members only commit one type of error. If the probability of this error is smaller than 0.5, then group decisions are better than those of individual members. In binary decision situations, however, two types of error may occur, the probabilities of which are independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of the theorem. Under this generalization, situations exists in which the probability of error is greater than 0.5 but the jury decision generates a higher expected welfare than an individual decision. Conversely, even if the probability of error is lower than 0.5 it is possible that individual decisions are superior.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 11-2010
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Firm Organization and Market Structure
- Subject
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group decisions
judicial
imperfect decision-making
Gerichtsbarkeit
Gruppenentscheidung
Abstimmungsparadoxon
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kirstein, Roland
von Wangenheim, Georg
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
- (where)
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Marburg
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
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20.09.2024, 8:22 AM CEST
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kirstein, Roland
- von Wangenheim, Georg
- Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Time of origin
- 2010