Arbeitspapier
Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims
Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the 'constrained equal award' solution.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-044/1
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Thema
-
Bankruptcy problems with claims
proportional rule
equal-awards rule
equal-losses rule
fairness
laboratory experiment
vignette
Insolvenzverwaltung
Gerechtigkeit
Verhandlungstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gächter, Simon
Riedl, Arno
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gächter, Simon
- Riedl, Arno
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2004