Arbeitspapier

Dividing justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the 'constrained equal award' solution.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-044/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
Bankruptcy problems with claims
proportional rule
equal-awards rule
equal-losses rule
fairness
laboratory experiment
vignette
Insolvenzverwaltung
Gerechtigkeit
Verhandlungstheorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gächter, Simon
Riedl, Arno
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gächter, Simon
  • Riedl, Arno
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2004

Ähnliche Objekte (12)