Dividing Justly in Bargaining Problems with Claims: Normative Judgments and Actual Negotiations

Arbeitspapier

Theoretical research on claims problems has concentrated on normative properties and axiomatizations of solution concepts. We complement these analyses by empirical evidence on the predictability of three classical solution concepts in a bankruptcy problem. We examine both people's impartial normative evaluations as well as their actual negotiation behavior in a bargaining with claims environment. We measure people's judgments on the normative attractiveness of solution concepts with the help of a survey and also observe actual agreements in a bargaining experiment with real money at stake. We find that the proportional solution is the normatively most attractive rule, whereas actual negotiation agreements are closest to the 'constrained equal award' solution.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1375

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Subject: bankruptcy problems with claims ; proportional rule ; equal-awards rule ; equallosses rule ; fairness ; laboratory experiment ; vignette ; Konkursverwaltung ; Gerechtigkeit ; Verhandlungstheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gächter, Simon ; Riedl, Arno
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20671
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET