Arbeitspapier
Ex Post Efficiency and Individual Rationality in Incentive Compatible Trading Mechanisms
This paper concerns the design of a trading mechanism for a group of traders when their valuations of the good are private information and they bargain over who shall consume more than his initial endowment and who shall consume less. It is shown that there generally exists a set of initial endowments of the traded commodity such that it is possible to design a trading mechanism which is incentive compatible, individually rational and ex post efficient.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 202
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Development Planning and Policy: Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy
- Thema
-
Efficient trading
mechanism design.
Verhandlungen
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lundgren, Stefan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
1988
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lundgren, Stefan
- The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
Entstanden
- 1988
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