Arbeitspapier

A Simple Solution to the Problem of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Choo and Siow Marriage Market Model

This paper proposes a simple solution to the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) problem in Choo and Siow (2006) model, overcoming what is probably the main limitation of this approach. The solution consists of assuming match-specific rather than choice-specific random preferences. The original marriage matching function gets modified by an adjustment factor that improves its empirical properties. Using the American Community Survey, I show that the new approach yields significantly different results affecting the qualitative conclusions of the analysis. The proposed solution to the IIA problem applies to other settings in which the relative "supply" of choices is observable.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: GLO Discussion Paper ; No. 387

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
Demographic Economics: General
Thema
Independence of irrelevant alternatives
marriage market
transferable utility

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gutierrez, Federico H.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Global Labor Organization (GLO)
(wo)
Essen
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gutierrez, Federico H.
  • Global Labor Organization (GLO)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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