Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally Robust

Arbeitspapier

A well-known result by Vega-Redondo implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the Walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 461

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Thema: Evolutionary game theory ; Stochastic stability ; Imita- tion ; Cournot markets ; Information ; Experiments ; Simulations ; Imitationsstrategie ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie ; Oligopol ; Allgemeines Gleichgewicht ; Test ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Apesteguia, Jose ; Huck, Steffen ; Oechssler, Jörg ; Weidenholzer, Simon
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
• (wo): Heidelberg
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127278
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ