Arbeitspapier
Assigning an unpleasant task without payment
How should a group of people decide to allocate a task that has to be done but is not adequately rewarded? This paper finds an optimal mechanism for the private provision of a public service in an environment without monetary transfers. All members of the group have the same cost of providing the service, but some individuals are better suited for the task than others. The optimal mechanism is a threshold rule that assigns the task randomly among volunteers if enough volunteers come forward, and otherwise assigns the task among the non-volunteers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 18-02
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Externalities
Public Goods
- Thema
-
Volunteering
public good provision
mechanism design
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goldlücke, Susanne
Tröger, Thomas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-440766
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goldlücke, Susanne
- Tröger, Thomas
- University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2018
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