Arbeitspapier

Pricing Payment Cards

Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial 'interchange' fees to cardholders' banks, on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that a network's profit-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure, over-subsidizing card usage and over-taxing merchants. In contrast to the literature we show that this distortion is systematic and arises from the fact that consumers make two distinct decisions (membership and usage) whereas merchants make only one (membership). These findings are robust to competition for cardholders and/or for merchants, network competition, and strategic card acceptance to attract consumers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ESMT Working Paper ; No. 10-005

Klassifikation
Management
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
Economics of Regulation
Antitrust Law
Thema
payment card networks
interchange fees
merchant fees
Kreditkartengesellschaft
Gebühr
Anreizregulierung
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Unvollkommener Wettbewerb
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bedre-Defolie, Özlem
Calvano, Emilio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2010

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201106143691
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bedre-Defolie, Özlem
  • Calvano, Emilio
  • European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)

Entstanden

  • 2010

Ähnliche Objekte (12)