Arbeitspapier
Pricing Payment Cards
Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial 'interchange' fees to cardholders' banks, on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that a network's profit-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure, over-subsidizing card usage and over-taxing merchants. In contrast to the literature we show that this distortion is systematic and arises from the fact that consumers make two distinct decisions (membership and usage) whereas merchants make only one (membership). These findings are robust to competition for cardholders and/or for merchants, network competition, and strategic card acceptance to attract consumers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ESMT Working Paper ; No. 10-005
- Klassifikation
-
Management
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
Economics of Regulation
Antitrust Law
- Thema
-
payment card networks
interchange fees
merchant fees
Kreditkartengesellschaft
Gebühr
Anreizregulierung
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Unvollkommener Wettbewerb
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bedre-Defolie, Özlem
Calvano, Emilio
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201106143691
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bedre-Defolie, Özlem
- Calvano, Emilio
- European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)
Entstanden
- 2010