Arbeitspapier

Efficient pricing of large value interbank payment systems

This paper studies the efficient pricing of large-value payment systems in the presence of unobservable heterogeneity about banks' future payment volumes. It is shown that the optimal pricing scheme for a public monopoly system involves quantity discounts in the form of a decreasing marginal fee. This is also true when the public system competes with a provate system characterized by a lower marginal cost. However in this case, optimal marginal fees in the public system are lower than its marginal cost, and fixed fees have to be levied. We also study the case of competition between several public systems. The structure of the optimal tariff depends on the willigness of Central Banks to allow by-pass.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 184

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Central Banks and Their Policies
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Thema
mixed duopoly
non-linear pricing
payment systems
public monopoly

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Holthausen, Cornelia
Rochet, Jean-Charles
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Holthausen, Cornelia
  • Rochet, Jean-Charles
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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