Arbeitspapier
Efficient pricing of large value interbank payment systems
This paper studies the efficient pricing of large-value payment systems in the presence of unobservable heterogeneity about banks' future payment volumes. It is shown that the optimal pricing scheme for a public monopoly system involves quantity discounts in the form of a decreasing marginal fee. This is also true when the public system competes with a provate system characterized by a lower marginal cost. However in this case, optimal marginal fees in the public system are lower than its marginal cost, and fixed fees have to be levied. We also study the case of competition between several public systems. The structure of the optimal tariff depends on the willigness of Central Banks to allow by-pass.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 184
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Central Banks and Their Policies
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Thema
-
mixed duopoly
non-linear pricing
payment systems
public monopoly
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Holthausen, Cornelia
Rochet, Jean-Charles
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
European Central Bank (ECB)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Holthausen, Cornelia
- Rochet, Jean-Charles
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Entstanden
- 2002