Arbeitspapier

Payment Evasion

This paper models payment evasion as a source of profit by letting the firm choose the purchase price and the fine imposed on detected payment evaders. For a given price and fine, the consumers purchase, evade payment, or choose the outside option. We show that payment evasion leads to a form of second-degree price discrimination in which the purchase price exceeds the expected fine faced by payment evaders. We also show that higher fines do not necessarily reduce payment evasion. Using data on fare dodging on public transportation, we quantify expected fines and payment evasion.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5342

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Thema
pricing
fine
price discrimination
deterrence

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Buehler, Stefan
Halbheer, Daniel
Lechner, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Buehler, Stefan
  • Halbheer, Daniel
  • Lechner, Michael
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)