Arbeitspapier
Payment Evasion
This paper models payment evasion as a source of profit by letting the firm choose the purchase price and the fine imposed on detected payment evaders. For a given price and fine, the consumers purchase, evade payment, or choose the outside option. We show that payment evasion leads to a form of second-degree price discrimination in which the purchase price exceeds the expected fine faced by payment evaders. We also show that higher fines do not necessarily reduce payment evasion. Using data on fare dodging on public transportation, we quantify expected fines and payment evasion.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5342
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- Thema
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pricing
fine
price discrimination
deterrence
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Buehler, Stefan
Halbheer, Daniel
Lechner, Michael
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Buehler, Stefan
- Halbheer, Daniel
- Lechner, Michael
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2015