Patient dumping, outlier payment, and optimal healthcare payment policy under asymmetric information

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospectivepayment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-off between the disutility of dumped patients (changes in hospitals' rent extracting due to low-severity patients) and the shift in the cost-reduction effort level for high-severity patients. We also clarify the welfare-improving conditions by allowing hospitals to dump high-severity patients. Finally, we show that if the efficiency of the cost-reduction effort varies by much and the healthcare payment cost is large, or if there exist many private hospitals, the insurer can improve social welfare in a wider environment.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 891

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Health Insurance, Public and Private ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Economics of Regulation
• Thema: patient dumping ; healthcare payment policy ; adverse selection

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Takahara, Tsuyoshi
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (wo): Osaka
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92701
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ