Arbeitspapier
Reciprocal Climate Negotiators
International climate negotiations have been troubled by mutual mistrust. At the same time, a hope seems to prevail that once enough countries moved forward, others would follow suit. If the abatement game faced by climate negotiators is a Prisoners' Dilemma, and countries are narrowly self-interested, such a hope seems unfounded. However, if countries display reciprocity a preference to repay meanness by meanness and kindness by kindness their willingness to abate will be conditional on others' abatement. I show that a full or majority coalition can be stable. This requires, however, that a majority of countries have relatively strong reciprocity preferences. No coalition participation is always stable. In addition, a stable minority coalition may exist; if so, it is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8866
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
- Thema
-
international environmental agreements
reciprocity
coalitions
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nyborg, Karine
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nyborg, Karine
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2015
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