Reciprocal climate negotiators: Balancing anger against even more anger

Arbeitspapier

I explore possible impacts of reciprocal preferences on participation in international environmental agreements. Reciprocal countries condition their willingness to abate on others' abatement. No participation is always stable. A full or majority coalition can be stable, provided that reciprocity is sufficiently strong and widespread. In addition, a stable minority coalition can exist, even with weak reciprocity preferences. This latter coalition is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Memorandum ; No. 17/2014

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
• Subject: International Environmental Agreements ; Reciprocity ; Coalitions

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Nyborg, Karine
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102050
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET