Reciprocal climate negotiators: Balancing anger against even more anger

Arbeitspapier

I explore possible impacts of reciprocal preferences on participation in international environmental agreements. Reciprocal countries condition their willingness to abate on others' abatement. No participation is always stable. A full or majority coalition can be stable, provided that reciprocity is sufficiently strong and widespread. In addition, a stable minority coalition can exist, even with weak reciprocity preferences. This latter coalition is weakly larger than the maximum stable coalition with standard preferences, but is characterized by mutually negative sentiments.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Memorandum ; No. 17/2014

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
• Thema: International Environmental Agreements ; Reciprocity ; Coalitions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Nyborg, Karine
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (wo): Oslo
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/102050
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ