Trade credit financing for supply chain coordination under financial challenges: a multi-leader–follower game approach
- Location
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
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2199-4730
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
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Trade credit financing for supply chain coordination under financial challenges: a multi-leader–follower game approach ; volume:9 ; number:1 ; day:4 ; month:1 ; year:2023 ; pages:1-39 ; date:12.2023
Financial innovation ; 9, Heft 1 (4.1.2023), 1-39, 12.2023
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Creator
- Contributor
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SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
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10.1186/s40854-022-00401-1
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023031320594944815922
- Rights
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Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
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14.08.2025, 11:00 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Emtehani, Faranak
- Nahavandi, Nasim
- Rafiei, Farimah Mokhatab
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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