Arbeitspapier

Mean-field leader-follower games with terminal state constraint

We analyze linear McKean-Vlasov forward-backward SDEs arising in leader-follower games with mean-field type control and terminal state constraints on the state process. We establish an existence and uniqueness of solutions result for such systems in time-weighted spaces as well as a convergence result of the solutions with respect to certain perturbations of the drivers of both the forward and the backward component. The general results are used to solve a novel single-player model of portfolio liquidation under market impact with expectations feedback as well as a novel Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation with asymmetrically informed players

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 129

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
mean-field control
Stackelberg game
mean-field game with a major player
McKean-Vlasov FBSDE
portfolio liquidation
singular terminal constraint

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fu, Guanxing
Horst, Ulrich
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
(where)
München und Berlin
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fu, Guanxing
  • Horst, Ulrich
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition

Time of origin

  • 2018

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