- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1573-2878
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Optimal Leader–Follower Control for the Fractional Opinion Formation Model ; day:10 ; month:8 ; year:2018 ; pages:1-15
Journal of optimization theory and applications ; (10.8.2018), 1-15
- Urheber
-
Almeida, Ricardo
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
- DOI
-
10.1007/s10957-018-1363-9
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2018101000433470750224
- Rechteinformation
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:35 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Almeida, Ricardo
- Malinowska, Agnieszka B.
- Odzijewicz, Tatiana
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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