- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1573-2878
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
online resource.
- Bibliographic citation
-
Optimal Leader–Follower Control for the Fractional Opinion Formation Model ; day:10 ; month:8 ; year:2018 ; pages:1-15
Journal of optimization theory and applications ; (10.8.2018), 1-15
- Creator
-
Almeida, Ricardo
- Contributor
- DOI
-
10.1007/s10957-018-1363-9
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2018101000433470750224
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:35 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Almeida, Ricardo
- Malinowska, Agnieszka B.
- Odzijewicz, Tatiana
- SpringerLink (Online service)
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