Arbeitspapier

Influential opinion leaders

We present a simple model of elections in which experts with special interests endorse candidates and endorsements are observed by the voters. We show that the equilibrium election outcome is biased towards the experts' interests even though voters know the distribution of expert interests and account for it when evaluating endorsements. Expert in uence is fully decentralized in the sense that individual experts have no incentive to exert influence. The effect arises when some agents prefer, ceteris paribus, to support the winning candidate and when experts are much better informed about the state of the world than are voters.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1485

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
election
manipulation
global game

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Steiner, Jakub
Stewart, Colin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Steiner, Jakub
  • Stewart, Colin
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 2010

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