- Alternative title
-
Design von Mechanismen für gute Gleichgewichte
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
Berlin, Technische Universität Berlin, Diss., 2014
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Keyword
-
Spieltheorie
Mechanismus-Design-Theorie
Informatik
Theorie
Spieltheorie
Mechanismus-Design-Theorie
Informatik
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (who)
-
Technische Universität Berlin
- (when)
-
2014
- Creator
-
Falkenhausen, Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von
- Contributor
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:83-opus4-53394
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
25.03.2025, 1:51 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Hochschulschrift
Associated
- Falkenhausen, Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von
- Harks, Tobias
- Möhring, Rolf H.
- Peis, Britta
- Technische Universität Berlin
Time of origin
- 2014
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