Arbeitspapier

Profitable cannibalization

Using a model with switching costs it is shown that firms may have an incentive to set up a new firm supplying to the same market under quite general conditions. The new firm attracts some market share of the founding firm. The start up firm is thus an act of cannibalization. Moreover, entry of the new firm may increase average prices. This is due to the fact that the new firm has more difficulties to overcome switching costs than incumbent firms. Competition may therefore be less intense.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers ; No. 27

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Thema
oligopoly
switching costs
price-increasing entry

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schulz, Norbert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Würzburg, Department of Economics
(wo)
Würzburg
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schulz, Norbert
  • University of Würzburg, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2001

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