Arbeitspapier

Profitable cannibalization

Using a model with switching costs it is shown that firms may have an incentive to set up a new firm supplying to the same market under quite general conditions. The new firm attracts some market share of the founding firm. The start up firm is thus an act of cannibalization. Moreover, entry of the new firm may increase average prices. This is due to the fact that the new firm has more difficulties to overcome switching costs than incumbent firms. Competition may therefore be less intense.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers ; No. 27

Classification
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Subject
oligopoly
switching costs
price-increasing entry

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schulz, Norbert
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Würzburg, Department of Economics
(where)
Würzburg
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schulz, Norbert
  • University of Würzburg, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2001

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