When unionisation is profitable for firms in network industries

Arbeitspapier

In an industry characterised by the presence of network effects, this paper investigates a duopolistic game in which firms may choose whether to bargain over wages and employment with unions or to face a competitive labour market (i.e. without unions). If unions are sufficiently risk-averse, it is shown that the presence of strong network effects makes unionisation the Pareto-efficient sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for firms. The issue of entry is also investigated.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2017-9

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
• Thema: unionised oligopoly ; competitive labour market ; efficient bargaining ; market entry and entry deterrence

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fanti, Luciano ; Buccella, Domenico
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155765
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ