When do firms exchange information?

Arbeitspapier

This paper further develops the standard modelling of information exchange between firms in the presence of demand uncertainty which applies to firms in new industries and insecure regions or markets. We replace the normal distribution of the random variables, commonly used because of its convenient mathematical properties, by an alternative one, namely a random variable with a binomial positive outcome. For the symmetric case, we confirm the results of the existing literature. However, for the non-symmetric case, we derive the new result that in the resulting Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the firms will disclose their information more often than they would under the standard modelling.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 181

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: Informationsaustausch ; Unternehmen ; Duopol ; Preiswettbewerb ; Unvollkommene Information ; Spieltheorie ; Informationsverhalten ; Öffentlichkeitsarbeit ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hornig, Stephan O.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
• (where): Tübingen
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47608
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-19678
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET