Differences in Social Preferences - Are They Profitable for the Firm?

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the impact of heterogeneous (social) preferences on the weighting and combination of performance measures as well as on a firm’s profitability. We consider rivalry, egoism and altruism as extreme forms within the continuum of possible preferences and show that the principal can typically exploit both the altruistic and rivalistic behavior of his agents. Firm profits reach their maximum value if the agents are differentiated as much as possible in their individual characteristics. We provide further insight; namely, that in order to realize these gains in profitability, it is necessary to reallocate participation in performance measures such that competitive agents are privileged as compared to altruistic agents. In this context, stochastic interdependencies are of importance since they yield overlapping functions of the share parameters, causing additional adaptations in the optimal design of the wage compensation system.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 2008-03

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Management ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Economics of Contract: Theory ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Thema: Social Preferences ; Rivalry ; Altruism ; Egoism ; Team Composition ; Performance Measurement

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Küpper, Hans-Ulrich ; Sandner, Kai
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Fakultät für Betriebswirtschaft
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.2122
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/104493
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2122-9
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ