Contracting with researchers

Arbeitspapier

We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents' success depends on effort and the choice of a research technology that is uncertain with respect to its quality. A single agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal's preferred technology choice. In the multiagent-setting researchers pursue individual rather than overall success which yields a preference for the most promising technology. We show that a mechanism that deters this bias towards mainstream research always entails an efficiency loss if researchers are risk-averse. Our results suggest that there is too little diversity in delegated research.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 20-2016

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness ; Economics of Contract: Theory
• Subject: Moral hazard ; Hidden action ; Incentives in teams ; Delegated research ; Academic organization ; Diversity in research

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Verbeck, Matthias ; Schulte, Elisabeth
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics
• (where): Marburg
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/144685
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET