Arbeitspapier
Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Project Mission
I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of effort by the choice of the project mission. The principal’s and the agents’ mission preferences are misaligned, and the agents have unobservable intrinsic motivation levels. I show that the non-contractibility of effort (asymmetric information) brings the mission closer to the agent’s (principal’s) preferences. Furthermore, when effort is non-contractible, the optimal mechanism i) has a “double distortion”' in the mission; ii) does not exclude low-types agents; and iii) can be implemented through a scoring auction. Several applications are discussed.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6181
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- Thema
-
optimal contracting
non-monetary incentives
mission preferences
intrinsic motivation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cassar, Lea
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cassar, Lea
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2016
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