Arbeitspapier

Optimal long-term contracting with learning

We introduce uncertainty into Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to study optimal long-term contracting with learning. In a dynamic relationship, the agent's shirking not only reduces current performance but also increases the agent's information rent due to the persistent belief manipulation effect. We characterize the optimal contract using the dynamic programming technique in which information rent is the unique state variable. In the optimal contract, the optimal effort is front-loaded and decreases stochastically over time. Furthermore, the optimal contract exhibits an option-like feature in that incentives increase after good performance. Implications about managerial incentives and asset management compensations are discussed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2016-10

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Economics of Contract: Theory
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Thema
executive compensation
moral hazard
Bayesian learning
hidden information
belief manipulation
private savings
continuous time
stock options

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
He, Zhiguo
Wei, Bin
Yu, Jianfeng
Gao, Feng
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
(wo)
Atlanta, GA
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • He, Zhiguo
  • Wei, Bin
  • Yu, Jianfeng
  • Gao, Feng
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta

Entstanden

  • 2016

Ähnliche Objekte (12)