Arbeitspapier
Contracting with third parties
In the bilateral hold-up model and the moral hazard in teams model, introducing a third party allows implementation of the first-best outcome, even if the agents can renegotiate inefficient outcomes and collude. Fines paid to the third party provide incentives for truth-telling and first-best levels of investment. Our results suggest that models that provide foundations for hold-up and incomplete contracts by invoking renegotiation are sensitive to the introduction of third parties.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CSIO Working Paper ; No. 0075
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Baliga, Sandeep
Sjöström, Tomas
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
- (where)
-
Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Baliga, Sandeep
- Sjöström, Tomas
- Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization (CSIO)
Time of origin
- 2005
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