Arbeitspapier
Government outsourcing: public contracting with private monopoly
The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation. The government maximizes total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds. An alternative to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels. However the government can contract ex-post with the private firms. This ex-post contracting set-up allows more flexibility than traditional regulation where government commits to both investment and operation cashflows. This is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1733
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Economics of Regulation
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
- Thema
-
Privatisierung
Adverse Selection
Natürliches Monopol
Theorie
Privatisierung
Adverse Selection
Natürliches Monopol
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Auriol, Emmanuelle
Picard, Pierre M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Auriol, Emmanuelle
- Picard, Pierre M.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2006