Arbeitspapier

Government outsourcing: public contracting with private monopoly

The paper studies the impact of government budget constraint in a pure adverse selection problem of monopoly regulation. The government maximizes total surplus but incurs some cost of public funds. An alternative to regulation is proposed in which firms are free to enter the market and to choose their price and output levels. However the government can contract ex-post with the private firms. This ex-post contracting set-up allows more flexibility than traditional regulation where government commits to both investment and operation cashflows. This is especially relevant in case of high technological uncertainties.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1733

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Economics of Regulation
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
Thema
Privatisierung
Adverse Selection
Natürliches Monopol
Theorie
Privatisierung
Adverse Selection
Natürliches Monopol
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Auriol, Emmanuelle
Picard, Pierre M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Auriol, Emmanuelle
  • Picard, Pierre M.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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