Konferenzbeitrag
Contracting with Researchers
We study a setting in which one or two agents conduct research on behalf of a principal. The agents binary performance level (suc- cess or failure) depends on their invested research e ort, and their choice of a research technology that is uncertain in respect of its apt- ness to generate a success. While in the single-agent-setting the agent has no incentive to deviate from the principal s preferred technology choice, this is not generally true for the multiagent-setting. When technologies are mutually exclusive - only one of them will be suit- able for yielding a high output - we show that there exists a contract that aligns the principal s and the agents interests. However, under the plausible assumption of scientists free technology choice, our re- sults suggest that there is a bias towards mainstream-research: Agents choose promising technologies more often than socially optimal.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Contracts ; No. A12-V1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Verbeck, Matthias
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (when)
-
2015
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Verbeck, Matthias
Time of origin
- 2015
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Contracting with Researchers
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Financial Contracting with Tax Evaders
Vertical Contracting with Endogenous Market Structure
A Theory of Delegated Contracting
Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up
Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion
Contracting frictions and inefficient layoffs of older workers
Can Network Effects Impede Optimal Contracting in Debt Securities?
WorldViews: Access to international textbooks for digital humanities researchers
Sharing is caring: a legal perspective on sharing language data containing personal data and the division of liability between researchers and research organisations