Bribery: Greed versus reciprocity

Arbeitspapier | Working paper

It is estimated that a trillion dollars are annually exchanged in bribes, distorting justice and economic efficiency. In a novel experiment, we investigate the drivers of bribery. Two participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the referee. When the referee can keep only the winner's bribe, bribes distort her judgment. When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her judgment. An extra-laboratory experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. Hence, our participants are influenced by bribes out of greed, and not because of a desire to reciprocate.

Object Details

• Extent: Seite(n): 91
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Status: Veröffentlichungsversion

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten (SP II 2016-203)

Classification and Topics

• Subject: Wirtschaft ; Psychologie ; Allgemeines, spezielle Theorien und Schulen, Methoden, Entwicklung und Geschichte der Wirtschaftswissenschaften ; angewandte Psychologie ; Korruption

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gneezy, Uri ; Saccardo, Silvia ; Veldhuizen, Roel van
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
• (where): Deutschland, Berlin
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130838
• Rights: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
• Last update: 21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST