Bribery: Greed versus reciprocity

Arbeitspapier

It is estimated that a trillion dollars are annually exchanged in bribes, distorting justice and economic efficiency. In a novel experiment, we investigate the drivers of bribery. Two participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the referee. When the referee can keep only the winner's bribe, bribes distort her judgment. When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her judgment. An extra-laboratory experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. Hence, our participants are influenced by bribes out of greed, and not because of a desire to reciprocate.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2016-203

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Subject: Bribery ; Reciprocity ; Laboratory Experiment ; Extra-Laboratory experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gneezy, Uri ; Saccardo, Silvia ; van Veldhuizen, Roel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130838
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET