Arbeitspapier

Social Reciprocity

We define social reciprocity as the act of demonstrating one's disapproval, at some personal cost, for the violation of widely-held norms (e.g., don't free ride). Social reciprocity differs from standard notions of reciprocity because social reciprocators intervene whenever a norm is violated and do not condition intervention on potential future payoffs, revenge, or altruism. Instead, we posit that social reciprocity is a triggered normative response. Our experiment confirms the existence of social reciprocity and demonstrates that more socially efficient outcomes arise when reciprocity can be expressed socially. To provide theoretical foundations for social reciprocity, we show that generalized punishment norms survive in one of the two stable equilibria of an evolutionary game with selection drift.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1347

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
reciprocity
norm
experiment
public good
learning
evolution
Soziale Beziehungen
Soziale Norm
Strafe
Evolutionäre Spieltheorie
Öffentliches Gut
Experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
Matthews, Peter Hans
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
  • Matthews, Peter Hans
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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