Social Reciprocity

Arbeitspapier

We define social reciprocity as the act of demonstrating one's disapproval, at some personal cost, for the violation of widely-held norms (e.g., don't free ride). Social reciprocity differs from standard notions of reciprocity because social reciprocators intervene whenever a norm is violated and do not condition intervention on potential future payoffs, revenge, or altruism. Instead, we posit that social reciprocity is a triggered normative response. Our experiment confirms the existence of social reciprocity and demonstrates that more socially efficient outcomes arise when reciprocity can be expressed socially. To provide theoretical foundations for social reciprocity, we show that generalized punishment norms survive in one of the two stable equilibria of an evolutionary game with selection drift.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1347

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
• Thema: reciprocity ; norm ; experiment ; public good ; learning ; evolution ; Soziale Beziehungen ; Soziale Norm ; Strafe ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie ; Öffentliches Gut ; Experiment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Carpenter, Jeffrey P. ; Matthews, Peter Hans
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20617
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ