Arbeitspapier

Mediocrity and induced reciprocity

We report evidence from an experiment where a principal chooses an agent out of two to perform a task for a fixed compensation. The principal's payoff depends on the agent's ex-ante ability and on a non-contractible effort that the agent has to exert once employed. We find that a significant share of principals select the mediocre agent (i.e. the one with the lower ex-ante ability). When the principal is allowed to send a message, mediocre agents exert more effort than agents with the higher ability, and principals who chooses mediocre agents on average have a larger payoff than principals who select agents with higher ability. This difference in effort overcompensates the difference in ability. Mediocre agents reciprocate more than agents who have ex-ante higher ability when the principals are able to make them feeling indebted.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,053

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
reciprocity
communication
incentives
mediocrity
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Kommunikation
Leistungsanreiz
Arbeitsleistung
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Montinari, Natalia
Nicolò, Antonio
Oexl, Regine
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Montinari, Natalia
  • Nicolò, Antonio
  • Oexl, Regine
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2012

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