Arbeitspapier
Mediocrity and induced reciprocity
We report evidence from an experiment where a principal chooses an agent out of two to perform a task for a fixed compensation. The principal's payoff depends on the agent's ex-ante ability and on a non-contractible effort that the agent has to exert once employed. We find that a significant share of principals select the mediocre agent (i.e. the one with the lower ex-ante ability). When the principal is allowed to send a message, mediocre agents exert more effort than agents with the higher ability, and principals who chooses mediocre agents on average have a larger payoff than principals who select agents with higher ability. This difference in effort overcompensates the difference in ability. Mediocre agents reciprocate more than agents who have ex-ante higher ability when the principals are able to make them feeling indebted.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2012,053
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
reciprocity
communication
incentives
mediocrity
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Kommunikation
Leistungsanreiz
Arbeitsleistung
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Montinari, Natalia
Nicolò, Antonio
Oexl, Regine
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Montinari, Natalia
- Nicolò, Antonio
- Oexl, Regine
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012