Arbeitspapier
Aggregation in networks
In this paper, we show that a concept of aggregation can hold in large network games with linear best replies. Breaking up large networks into smaller subnetworks, which can be replaced by representative players, leads to a coarse-grained description of strategic interactions. This method of summarizing complex strategic interactions by simple ones can be applied to compute all Nash equilibria for the special network structure of cograph. A key finding is that a stable Nash equilibrium of the large network game can be decomposed into a collection of Nash equilibria of subnetwork games. Thereby, we establish a systematic relationship between player's position in a subnetwork and his equilibrium action in the large network game.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: School of Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2109
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Public Goods
- Subject
-
aggregation
modular decomposition
network games
public goods
stability
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Allouch, Nizar
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Kent, School of Economics
- (where)
-
Canterbury
- (when)
-
2021
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Allouch, Nizar
- University of Kent, School of Economics
Time of origin
- 2021
Other Objects (12)
Aggregation in networks
Aggregation in Matching Markets
Revealed Preference and Aggregation
Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms
Aggregation in large dynamic panels
Aggregation in large dynamic panels
Aggregation-theoretic monetary aggregation over the euro area, when countries are heterogeneous
Aggregation and Aggregation Biases in Production Functions: A Panel Data Analysis of Translog Models
Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting
Conditioning and Aggregation of Preferences
Aggregation in networks
Aggregation in Matching Markets
Revealed Preference and Aggregation
Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms
Aggregation in large dynamic panels
Aggregation in large dynamic panels
Aggregation-theoretic monetary aggregation over the euro area, when countries are heterogeneous
Aggregation and Aggregation Biases in Production Functions: A Panel Data Analysis of Translog Models
Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting
Conditioning and Aggregation of Preferences
Aggregation in networks
Aggregation in Matching Markets
Revealed Preference and Aggregation
Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms
Aggregation in large dynamic panels
Aggregation in large dynamic panels
Aggregation-theoretic monetary aggregation over the euro area, when countries are heterogeneous
Aggregation and Aggregation Biases in Production Functions: A Panel Data Analysis of Translog Models
Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting