Arbeitspapier
Persuasion and information aggregation in elections
This paper studies a large majority election with voters who have heterogeneous, private preferences and exogenous private signals. We show that a Bayesian persuader can implement any state-contingent outcome in some equilibrium by providing additional information. In this setting, without the persuader's information, a version of the Condorcet Jury Theorem holds. Persuasion does not require detailed knowledge of the voters' private information and preferences: the same additional information is effective across environments. The results require almost no commitment power by the persuader. Finally, the persuasion mechanism is effective also in small committees with as few as 15 members.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 112
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Information Aggregation
Bayes Correlated Equilibria
Persuasion
Condorcet Jury Theorem
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Heese, Carl
Lauermann, Stephan
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
- (where)
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Bonn and Cologne
- (when)
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2021
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Heese, Carl
- Lauermann, Stephan
- University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
Time of origin
- 2021