Information aggregation in Poisson elections

Artikel

The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We find that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which information is not aggregated. The main driving force is that, everything else equal, voters are more likely to be pivotal if the population is small.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 17 ; Year: 2022 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-23 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Political economy ; voting ; information aggregation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ekmekci, Mehmet ; Lauermann, Stephan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2022

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE3849
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/253498
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET