More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

Arbeitspapier

Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is an extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2013-035

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Subject: ultimatum bargaining ; experiment ; social preferences

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Güth, Werner ; Kocher, Martin G.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2013

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/85032
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET