Blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining: A theoretical and experimental analysis

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes blindfolded versus informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Analyzing the transition from one information setting to the other suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining due to task-independent strategies such as 'equal sharing' or the 'golden mean.' The probability of successful bargaining is lower in case of blindfolded than informed ultimatum bargaining.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 90

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: ultimatum bargaining ; information structure ; experimental economics

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Güth, Werner ; Pull, Kerstin ; Stadler, Manfred ; Zaby, Alexandra
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
• (where): Tübingen
• (when): 2016

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.15496/publikation-10884
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/140630
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-694705
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET