Arbeitspapier
Blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining: A theoretical and experimental analysis
This paper analyzes blindfolded versus informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Analyzing the transition from one information setting to the other suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining due to task-independent strategies such as 'equal sharing' or the 'golden mean.' The probability of successful bargaining is lower in case of blindfolded than informed ultimatum bargaining.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 90
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
ultimatum bargaining
information structure
experimental economics
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Zaby, Alexandra
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
- (wo)
-
Tübingen
- (wann)
-
2016
- DOI
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doi:10.15496/publikation-10884
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-694705
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Güth, Werner
- Pull, Kerstin
- Stadler, Manfred
- Zaby, Alexandra
- University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
Entstanden
- 2016