Arbeitspapier

Blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining: A theoretical and experimental analysis

This paper analyzes blindfolded versus informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Analyzing the transition from one information setting to the other suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining due to task-independent strategies such as 'equal sharing' or the 'golden mean.' The probability of successful bargaining is lower in case of blindfolded than informed ultimatum bargaining.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 90

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
ultimatum bargaining
information structure
experimental economics

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Güth, Werner
Pull, Kerstin
Stadler, Manfred
Zaby, Alexandra
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
(wo)
Tübingen
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.15496/publikation-10884
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-694705
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Güth, Werner
  • Pull, Kerstin
  • Stadler, Manfred
  • Zaby, Alexandra
  • University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences

Entstanden

  • 2016

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