Incentives for environmental R&D

Arbeitspapier

Since governments can influence the demand for a new abatement technology through their environmental policy, they may be able to expropriate innovations in new abatement technology ex post. This suggests that incentives for environmental R&D may be lower than the incentives for market goods R&D. This in turn may be used as an argument for environmental R&D getting more public support than other R&D. In this paper we systematically compare the incentives for environmental R&D with the incentives for market goods R&D. We find that the relationship might be the opposite: When the innovator is able to commit to a licence fee before environmental policy is resolved, incentives are always higher for environmental R&D than for market goods R&D. When the government sets its policy before or simultaneously with the innovator's choice of licence fee, incentives for environmental R&D may be higher or lower than for market goods R&D.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Memorandum ; No. 2011,15

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General ; Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy
• Thema: R&D ; environmental R&D ; innovations ; endogenous technological change ; Industrielle Forschung ; Umwelttechnik ; Innovation ; Ökonomischer Anreiz ; Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik ; Umweltpolitik ; Endogener technischer Fortschritt ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Greaker, Mads ; Hoel, Michael
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (wo): Oslo
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47349
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ