Arbeitspapier
Price reactions when consumers are concerned about pro-social reputation
In this paper, we propose a reputation-signalling model of demand for consumer goods containing pro-social characteristics such as a 'fair trade' or 'organic' certification. We show that reputation signalling can reverse price reactions resembling the crowding-out of pre-existing motives for pro-social behavior seen in situations of volunteering and charitable giving. Finally, using a unique combination of questionnaire and purchase panel data, we present evidence of such reputation-driven reversal of price reactions in the Danish market for organic milk.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IFRO Working Paper ; No. 2014/09
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Consumer Economics: Theory
Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Exchange and Production Economies
- Thema
-
net-crowding out
reversed price reactions
pro-social reputation
reputation signalling
consumer goods
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kahsay, Goytom Abraha
Andersen, Laura Mørch
Hansen, Lars Gårn
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO)
- (wo)
-
Copenhagen
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kahsay, Goytom Abraha
- Andersen, Laura Mørch
- Hansen, Lars Gårn
- University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics (IFRO)
Entstanden
- 2014
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