When Ignorance is Bliss: Information Asymmetries Enhance Prosocial Behavior in Dicator Games

Arbeitspapier

In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players. Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To asses the effect of information asymmetries on prosocial behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a simple non-strategic interaction. A dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We observe subjects with heterogenous social preferences. While under symmetric information only individuals with the same type of preferences transfer, under asymmetric information different types transfer at the same time. As a consequence and the main finding of our experiment, uninformed dictators behave more prosocially than informed dictators.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper Series ; No. 13-07r

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
• Thema: Asymmetric Information ; Prosocial Behavior ; Efficiency Concern ; Inequality Aversion ; Dictator Game

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Winschel, Evguenia ; Zahn, Philipp
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Mannheim, Department of Economics
• (wo): Mannheim
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129549
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-366320
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ