Ignorance is bliss: Rationality, information and equilibrium

Arbeitspapier

An information-theoretic thought experiment is developed to provide a methodology for predicting endowment distributions in the absence of information on agent preferences. The allocation problem is first presented as a stylised knapsack problem. Although this knapsack allocation is intractable, the social planner can nevertheless make precise predictions concerning the endowment distribution by using its information-theoretic structure. By construction these predictions do not rest on the rationality of agents. It is also shown, however, that the knapsack problem is equivalent to a congestion game under weak assumptions, which means that the planner can nevertheless evaluate the optimality of the unobserved allocation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: School of Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 11,03

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Mathematical Methods ; Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; Exchange and Production Economies ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
• Thema: Information theoretic measure ; knapsack problem ; congestion game ; potential function

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Barde, Sylvain
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Kent, School of Economics
• (wo): Canterbury
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50621
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:22 MESZ