Arbeitspapier
Ignorance is bliss: Voter education and alignment in distributive politics
Central-government politicians channel resources to sub-national entities for political gains. We show formally that the central politicians' allocation decision has two drivers: political alignment (between central and local politicians) and the level of local political accountability. However, drivers count one at a time: alignment matters before local elections, while local political accountability matters before central elections. We then perform a test of our model using Brazilian data, which corroborates our results. Furthermore, we show and explain why political accountability becomes a curse: better-educated districts receive fewer transfers in equilibrium.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Texto para discussão ; No. 690
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
- Thema
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Federalism
Distributive Politics
Partisan Alignment
Voters' Education
Political Accountability
Brazil
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Boffa, Federico
Cavalcanti, Francisco
Piolatto, Amedeo
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
- (wo)
-
Rio de Janeiro
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Boffa, Federico
- Cavalcanti, Francisco
- Piolatto, Amedeo
- Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
Entstanden
- 2021