Arbeitspapier

Ignorance is bliss: Voter education and alignment in distributive politics

Central-government politicians channel resources to sub-national entities for political gains. We show formally that the central politicians' allocation decision has two drivers: political alignment (between central and local politicians) and the level of local political accountability. However, drivers count one at a time: alignment matters before local elections, while local political accountability matters before central elections. We then perform a test of our model using Brazilian data, which corroborates our results. Furthermore, we show and explain why political accountability becomes a curse: better-educated districts receive fewer transfers in equilibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Texto para discussão ; No. 690

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Thema
Federalism
Distributive Politics
Partisan Alignment
Voters' Education
Political Accountability
Brazil

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boffa, Federico
Cavalcanti, Francisco
Piolatto, Amedeo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
(wo)
Rio de Janeiro
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:20 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boffa, Federico
  • Cavalcanti, Francisco
  • Piolatto, Amedeo
  • Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia

Entstanden

  • 2021

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