Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes

Arbeitspapier

We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of this third party involvement. Our main finding is that the potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he enters bargaining directly. Our results lend support to the tendency towards decentralisation of pay bargaining in the public sector in Europe.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 395

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Subject: Bargaining ; public sector ; stakeholders ; strikes ; labour relations ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Öffentlicher Dienst ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Streik ; Agency Theory ; Stakeholder ; Firmentarifvertrag ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Shields, Michael A. ; Price, Stephen Wheatley
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21255
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET