Arbeitspapier

Regulation and Wage Bargaining

In many regulated industries labour uions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. We study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. Compared to the case in which wages do not depend on the regime under which the firm is regulated, allowing for endogenously determined wages has ambiguous effects on the regulatory contract.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Memorandum ; No. 13/1998

Classification
Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
Subject
wages
bargaining
regulation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dalen, D.M.
von der Fehr, N.-H. M.
Moen, E. R.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(where)
Oslo
(when)
1998

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dalen, D.M.
  • von der Fehr, N.-H. M.
  • Moen, E. R.
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 1998

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