Arbeitspapier
Regulation and Wage Bargaining
In many regulated industries labour uions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. We study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. Compared to the case in which wages do not depend on the regime under which the firm is regulated, allowing for endogenously determined wages has ambiguous effects on the regulatory contract.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 13/1998
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Economics of Regulation
- Subject
-
wages
bargaining
regulation
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Dalen, D.M.
von der Fehr, N.-H. M.
Moen, E. R.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Oslo
- (when)
-
1998
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dalen, D.M.
- von der Fehr, N.-H. M.
- Moen, E. R.
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1998