Arbeitspapier

Vertical bargaining and obfuscation

Manufacturers often engage in practices that impede consumer search. Examples include proliferating product varieties, imposing vertical informational restraints, and banning online sales to make it more difficult for consumers to compare prices. This paper models vertical bargaining over wholesale prices and obfuscation levels and finds that obfuscation arises in equilibrium whenever retailers have some bargaining power. Once the bargaining power rests with the manufacturer, the equilibrium involves no obfuscation. The final consumers, however, are worse off compared with settings when retailers have all the bargaining power. We show that in vertical markets, policies that impose caps on obfuscation may induce higher wholesale and retail prices. Instead, we propose caps on wholesale prices as an effective consumer protection policy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2022-13

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
Economic models
Market structure and pricing

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Reshidi, Edona
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2022-13
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Reshidi, Edona
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2022

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