Arbeitspapier
Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes
We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a bilateral agreement. We explore the strategic implications of this third party involvement. Our main finding is that the potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he enters bargaining directly. Our results lend support to the tendency towards decentralisation of pay bargaining in the public sector in Europe.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 395
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
Bargaining
public sector
stakeholders
strikes
labour relations
Verhandlungstheorie
Öffentlicher Dienst
Lohnverhandlungstheorie
Streik
Agency Theory
Stakeholder
Firmentarifvertrag
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Shields, Michael A.
Price, Stephen Wheatley
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Shields, Michael A.
- Price, Stephen Wheatley
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2001
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